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EVALUATING MISTAKES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW:
CONFIGURING THE SYSTEM TO ACCOUNT
FOR IMPERFECTION
by
Maureen A. O'Rourke*

In this Essay, the authorargues that in assessingthe performance of the intellectual
property laws, it is useful to conceive of intellectualproperty law as a system comprised of both interacting decision-makers and other sets of law. Those decisionmakers include Congress, the PTO, and courts, and the other relevant laws include
antitrust and contract. The author reviews the major intellectualproperty statutes,
illustratingways in which different institutions may be situated to correct the errors
of another and how antitrust and contract also can work to correct errors in the
scope of protection. The Essay concludes by arguing that the real challengefor the
future is to formulate a consistent theoretical paradigm to guide institutions in
decision-making and reduce the probability and cost of mistakes.
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INTRODUCTION

It is no accident that the turn of the century is also likely to mark a
turning point in intellectual property law. The advanced technology of
the late twentieth century is challenging the intellectual property system
as traditionally conceived and justified. In recent years, particularly as digital technology has become ubiquitous, Congress, the Patent and Trade* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. Thanks to Lydia Loren for
inviting me to participate in the Fifth Annual Lewis & Clark Law Forum, Intellectual
Property in the New Millennium; Keeping Pace with Change, October 1, 1999.
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mark Office (PTO), and courts have grappled with the questions of
whether and how to protect new forms of intellectual work products.
While it is certainly always appropriate to assess both the content of public policy and institutional performance in advancing that policy, it is particularly important to do so now. Decision-makers today are shaping the
law that will provide the backdrop against which twenty-first century
advances will or will not occur. It is worthwhile to consider whether their
performance might be improved by reevaluating the role of intellectual
property in furthering innovation as well as its place within the broader
legal framework of both public and private law.
This inquiry is necessarily complex, at least in part because commentators apply different metrics for evaluating performance, reflecting their
diverse beliefs about exactly what the purpose of the intellectual property
system is. Yet, regardless of what theoretical justification one selects, it
would not be surprising to find that the system only approximates it in
practical implementation. A perfect intellectual property system in which
no decision-maker ever errs would be prohibitively expensive. Thus, the
fact that the system may not always accord the appropriate scope of protection within a particular theoretical paradigm is not facially a cause for
undue concern since it cannot reasonably be expected to do so. The real
question is whether cost-effective measures exist that one or more institutions could adopt to increase the probability that the overall system will
more perfectly reflect its theoretical underpinnings, however defined. If
such measures do exist, then a failure to implement them is inefficient
and a "mistake," in this Essay's terminology.
Another, different type of error occurs when decision-makers apply
an appropriate law incorrectly. For example, even if Congress were to
adopt a statutory scheme that reflected the social optimum, that level still
may not be attained if the PTO and courts err in interpreting and applying the legislation. This suggests that ongoing systematic evaluation of
decision-makers' performance is also advisable in assessing whether institutions are moving the system closer to or further from the socially desirable state.
Further, the intellectual property system is not monolithic. It is part
of a larger system of law that also influences whether the ultimate outcome is one of awarding intellectual work products the appropriate scope
of rights. In particular, the public law of antitrust and private law of contract both often operate to adjust the scope of the federal right. Therefore, any evaluation of the intellectual property scheme must also
consider how this broader context impacts its ability to reach its underlying policy goals.
This Essay briefly considers parts of these issues, using particular
(but by no means exclusive) examples from each of the major intellectual
property disciplines to illuminate the discussion. After a brief overview of
the system and its theoretical underpinnings, this Essay begins with copyright, contending that recent amendments to the Copyright Act depart
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from the widely accepted utilitarian paradigm that justifies the grant of
copyright rights. It suggests that Congress should revisit its recent legislation but also points out that because courts have a variety of copyright
doctrines available to them to fine-tune the scope of the statutory rights,
they may be able to correct many of Congress's errors. As a general matter then, congressional errors-particularly when reflected in legislative
standards rather than rules-may not be excessively costly in copyright
law so long as the judiciary acts appropriately in applying scope-limiting
doctrines.
Patent law may present a different picture. Patent law uses the PTO
as an intermediary between Congress and the courts to evaluate particular inventions for consistency with statutory standards. But if the PTO is
set up in a manner that encourages examiners to issue patents on inventions that do not meet the statutory standards, the courts will have to be
doubly vigilant in reassessing PTO decisions. Yet patent law is less accommodating of ex post judicial fine-tuning of rights than copyright. This
Essay argues that a patent doctrine of fair use informed by its copyright
counterpart could make error correction by the courts more likely while
also providing them with a principled way to deal with new issues such as
ensuring competition in the software and biotechnology industries.
Finally, in trademark law, this Essay argues that both Congress and
the courts have made mistakes by increasingly according marks property
right status in themselves rather than in association with the goods or
services to which they relate. Trademark law highlights the fact that
courts should exercise care in applying existing law and adapting it to
new technologies, and Congress should consider providing additional
guidance to them.
In its latter parts, this Essay considers how antitrust and contract law
factor in to the intellectual property system. The courts' use of antitrust
law to limit a right owner's ability to misuse market power obtained
through the exercise of an intellectual property right may increasingly
shape parties' expectations regarding the scope of their rights. In the private law arena, the manner in which courts address contractual provisions
that create private schemes of intellectual property protection will prominently influence whether and how the intellectual property statutes
achieve their underlying goals. In both cases, these sets of laws can help
to account for intellectual property's failures to implement the socially
optimal level of protection.
II.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEM

Commentators have offered a number of different theoretical models that support the grant of intellectual property rights. Professor William Fisher has summarized the historical models as: (i) the Lockean
labor-dessert theory, emphasizing the natural right of a person to the
results of his or her labor; (ii) the utilitarian philosophy, stressing that the
system should be designed to achieve the greatest good for the greatest
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number; (iii) the self-actualization personality theory, advocating the
design of a set of entitlements most conducive to human flourishing; and
(iv) proprietarian or social planning theory, arguing that property rights
should be shaped to encourage the attainment of a just culture.' Obviously, each approach emphasizes different considerations, but they do
tend to blur and overlap. At any given time, the relevant decision-maker
may emphasize one particular strand of thought, although Congress, the
PTO, and courts tend seldom to clearly articulate what theory is informing a policy choice. This shifting confluence of theories and their application makes it difficult to evaluate the system's performance in a rigorous
analytical manner.
Without a categorical classification of what theories or combinations
of philosophies underlie the grant of intellectual property rights in particular works, it is virtually impossible to accurately assess the system's performance. However, at least in American law, the leading theory probably
still continues to be a utilitarian one. This perspective emphasizes the
need to provide incentives to the firstcomer to create while maintaining a
viable public domain from which secondcomers may draw in improving
and building on the original work. The social optimum then might be
defined as the level of protection that provides the creator with just
enough incentive to invest while dedicating to the public sufficient information from which further progress may result. The intellectual property
system adopts a multi-layered approach in attempting to implement the
social optimum in a cost-effective manner.
The first institution that assesses the desirability and scope of protection in light of the utilitarian paradigm is, of course, Congress. Certainly
over the years, that institution has expanded protection by bringing more
works within the purview of the intellectual property acts and strengthening the rights themselves. Without more, though, such as an evaluation of
the starting point from which Congress made such changes, it is difficult
to conclude that the present state is one of over- or under-protection in
the aggregate. Adding to the difficulty of evaluating congressional performance is the fact that the legislation contains relatively few bright-line
rules. Rather, it emphasizes vague standards that are given more specific
content by another decision-maker such as the PTO or the courts. In
part, the legislators' use of standards is driven by the need for flexibility.
Technology changes rapidly, bringing new works of authorship and new
inventions to the market. Moreover, the market itself is dynamic, making
it even less advisable for Congress to enshrine static definitions of statutory subject matter and the corresponding rights. This suggests that the
most profitable evaluation of Congress might focus on whether the
bright-line rules that it enacts are correct, and whether the standards it
' See William W. Fisher III,
REv. 1203, 1214 (1998).

Property

and Contract on the Interet, 73
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provides are capable of sensible application and reflective of the appropriate theoretical underpinnings.
Further, because of the legislative drafting style, both the PTO and
courts are primarily charged with the task of tailoring protection to
reflect the social optimum. The PTO, in the case of patents and trademarks, performs primarily an ex ante sorting function, deciding which
inventions and marks qualify for statutory benefits. The courts act in
more of an ex post capacity, although they do also review the sorting
decisions of the PTO, deciding concrete disputes when more information
is available about the particular industry and right at issue. In evaluating
these decision-makers, it may be helpful to consider institutional features
that may lead to some errors being more common than others. For example, the PTO compensation system may encourage examiners to issue
patents regardless of validity, suggesting that the PTO may err on the side
of overprotection. 2 Institutionally, the courts are unlikely to reflect a systematic skewing toward under- or over-protection although intellectual
property plaintiffs tend to be rather sympathetic and the statutes set up
certain presumptions from which they benefit.3 Perhaps the best way to
evaluate the courts is to consider whether they have the appropriate doctrinal tailoring tools available to them and whether their exercise of those
tools is consistent with utilitarian theory, particularly in areas involving
new technology.
Not surprisingly, the net result is a system in which court precedent
interpreting the legislation and reviewing the decisions of the PTO provides more precise content to the statutory standards. To the extent that
one decision-maker in the process errs, the mistake may be less costly
because another institution may be well situated to correct it. For example, the courts often correct the errors of the PTO and fine-tune protection to an appropriate level. This provides right-holders with a set of
expectations regarding the scope of their rights. In turn, these expectations help to define a right-holder's strategy in exploiting its intellectual
property-whether to use it at all and, if so, whether to do so in-house or
by licensing others. From a social perspective, the precedent provides the
public with an analogous set of expectations regarding the scope of its
2 See Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property
Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKEt-EY TECH. L.J. 577, 609
(1999) ("The current bonus system is believed to skew incentives in favor of granting

patents.").
' See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (1994) ("A certificate of registration of a mark...
shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of the
registration of the mark, of the registrant's ownership of the mark, and of the
registrant's exclusive right to use the registered mark .... ."); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1065
(setting forth conditions under which a mark becomes incontestable); 17 U.S.C.

§ 410(c) (1994) ("In any judicial proceedings the certificate of a [copyright]
registration made before or within five years after first publication of the work shall
constitute prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts stated
in the certificate."); 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1994) ("A patent shall be presumed valid.").
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rights by delineating protected information from that which belongs to
the public domain. At the same time, while the courts generally are the
decision-makers of last resort, Congress stands ready to step in and correct their miscues. This entire system provides the backdrop against
which to measure performance in a utilitarian paradigm.
III.

COPYRIGHT LAW

Nineteen ninety-eight proved to be an interesting year for the Copyright Act. The ongoing development and improvement of technology
that allows entities to make quick, cheap, and easy copies without any
degradation in quality from the original continued to challenge the
incentive scheme of the copyright system. At the same time, copyright
owners from the "low-tech" era, including Walt Disney, began to express
concern about their creations passing into the public domain. 4 Toward
the end of 1998, Congress enacted the Digital Millenium Copyright Act
(DMCA) 5 to address at least in part the first of these concerns, and the
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act 6 to deal with the latter. At
least some segments of the DMCA and the Bono Act provide illustrations
of how Congress may have departed from the utilitarian paradigm.
The DMCA broadly prohibits both circumvention of technological
measures that control access to copyrighted works 7 and trafficking in
devices that would allow such circumvention. 8 At the same time, Congress, recognizing that there may be a significant number of occasions in
which circumvention would be socially desirable, provided for a study
period of two years before the circumvention ban takes effect. 9 Additionally, it provided certain exemptions, authorizing circumvention in some
4 See E. Scott Johnson, Law Gives Copyrights New Life, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 8, 1999, at
C12 (noting that large companies owning copyrights in older, still valuable works,
such as Time Warner and Disney, were "strong proponents of [] legislation"
increasing copyright terms).
5 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in various
sections of the Copyright Act and title 28 U.S.C.).
6 Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended in various
sections of the Copyright Act).
7 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1998) ("No person shall circumvent a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this
title.").
' Id. § 1201 (a) (2) ("No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public,
provide, or otherwise traffic in any technology... that (A) is primarily designed or
produced for the purpose of circumventing a technological measure that effectively
controls access to a work protected under this title."). See also id. § 1201(b) (1)
(similarly banning trafficking in devices designed to circumvent technology
protecting any right of a copyright owner).
' Id. § 1201 (a) (1) (A)-(E) (authorizing the Register of Copyrights to recommend
the Librarian of Congress to study the impact of the anti-circumvention provisions on
users of copyrighted works, to publish a list of those copyrighted works for which
noninfringing uses may be adversely affected, and to exempt such works from the
anti-circumvention provisions for a period of time).
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cases. 10 Facially this approach seems in line with the utilitarian paradigm
as it seeks to balance the rights of copyright owners and the public.
However, the DMCA contains some anomalies. For example, while
the ban on circumvention will not take effect for two years, the ban on
trafficking took effect immediately." That same trafficking ban is likely
also to eviscerate the ability of others, besides the copyright owner, to
circumvent technological measures in situations that are authorized by
the Act. In other words, the trafficking ban undercuts the permitted uses,
making the public's right to engage in those uses rather hollow, potentially upsetting the utilitarian balance between the rights of copyright
owners and those of the public.
The obvious and preferable solution would be for Congress to reassess the DMCA and clarify its inconsistencies. In the absence of congressional action, the task of ensuring the appropriate balance will rest with
the courts. Different courts could reach varying results, but rules of statutory interpretation coupled with the utilitarian underpinnings of copyright may make a judicial narrowing of the seemingly inconsistent Act a
viable short-term solution.1 2 Thus, the judiciary can help to restore the
utilitarian balance that Congress has perhaps unwittingly disregarded. In
turn, the Bono Act provides an even clearer example of how courts can
mitigate congressional errors by applying scope-defining doctrines.
The intellectual property system is not costless, as its infrastructure
relies on the expenditure of both private and public funds to remain in
operation. In a utilitarian paradigm these costs should not be incurred if
works would be created in the absence of intellectual property protection. The Bono Act extended the period of protection for works created
before 1978 from seventy-five to ninety-five years.1 3 For works created in
1978 or after, the Act extended the term from life of the author plus fifty
years to life of the author plus seventy. 14 Obviously, already existing works
did not require the incentive of an additional twenty years' protection for
10 Id. § 1201 (d)-(g)
(providing certain shelters from the anti-circumvention
provisions for libraries, educational institutions, law enforcement, reverse
engineering, and encryption research).
11 Id. § 1201 (a) (1) (A) ("The prohibition contained in the preceding sentence
shall take effect at the end of the 2-year period beginning on the date of the
enactment of this chapter."); Id. § 1201 (a) (2).
12 See Pamela Samuelson, IntellectualProperty and the Digital Economy: Why the AntiCircumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TEcH. L.J. 519, 537-57 (1999)
(discussing how courts can narrow the application of the DMCA to arrive at
appropriate results, but noting that Congress should have delegated more discretion
to the courts "so that [they] will not have to thrash to reach appropriate results").
13 17 U.S.C. § 304(b) (Supp. IV 1998) ("Any copyright still in its renewal term at
the time that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act becomes effective shall
have a copyright term of 95 years from the date copyright was originally secured.").
14 Id. at § 302(a) ("Copyright in a work created on or after January 1, 1978,
subsists from its creation and, except as provided by the following subsections,
endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and 70 years after the author's
death.").
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their production. Those copyright owners now receive the benefit of an
additional unanticipated twenty years during which they may extract
rents while the public bears the cost of waiting those extra years for protected works to pass into the public domain. This change facially does not
15
seem to be in accord with the utilitarian paradigm.
Perhaps lengthening the copyright term for pre-existing works would
be justifiable if it were in accord with one of the other theories that could
support the grant of intellectual property rights. However, it is difficult to
see how any theory could justify increasing protection for works that were
created under the earlier bargain of life plus fifty years.
While this change does seem inadvisable, does it necessarily translate
into large costs for the public? Perhaps not. Courts in copyright cases
have an array of doctrines available-from the idea/expression dichotomy to merger to scnes i faire to fair use-that allow them to fine-tune
the scope of the right. Moreover, at least some of these doctrines, particularly fair use, tend to be time-sensitive, allowing more use of information
if relevant market indicators demonstrate that competition would be
enhanced by permitting certain uses to proceed.
Court-applied, scope-limiting doctrines do make the contours of the
copyright right less certain. If one believes that Congress has acted in
accordance with the utilitarian paradigm, then oft-exercised judicial discretion may be undesirable because uncertainty regarding scope may
increase the cost of licensing negotiations. The reality that Congress does
err, though, suggests that these scope-limiting doctrines perform a useful
function by helping to move the system closer to the social optimum if
correctly applied. The higher costs attributable to uncertainty regarding
the right's scope may be more than offset by the social benefit of improving the system's performance.
IV.

PATENT LAW

Despite the fact that patent law and copyright law share the same
theoretical underpinnings and overarching goals, patent generally
accommodates less ex post fine-tuning of the statutory right than copy1" See Affidavit of Hal R. Varian, 1 4, 12, Edred v. Reno (No. 1:99CV00065JLG),
available at <http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/eldredvreno/varian.pdf> (last modified
July 7, 1999).
In my opinion, there is no economic rationale for applying copyright extension
to pre-existing works. The incentives to produce these works are those that
existed at the time of creation. If these incentives were deemed adequate at the
time, there is no additional social benefit from extending them
retrospectively.... If the work is already created, then there is no incentive effect
at all from lengthening the term of protection.... No matter how long we extend
the copyright term, we won't get any more works produced by Charles Dickens.
I& The lawsuit challenging the term extension on constitutional grounds was dismissed on the pleadings. See Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999) (holding
extension did not violate the First Amendment, copyright clause or Public Trust
doctrine).
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right. Since the preceding has established that doctrinal fine-tuning tools
can perform a useful role in copyright law, it is worthwhile to consider
whether patent law also contains appropriate limiting doctrines.
New technology, particularly in software and biotechnology, has
presented challenges for the existing patent system. While Congress has
made some changes to the Patent Act, the institution on the forefront of
patent policy for high technology has been the PTO. As an institutional
matter, as Professor Merges notes, the PTO is likely to err on the side of
issuing rather than denying patents. 16 Not all patents are litigated. Thus,
some invalid patents overhang the market, skewing both the distribution
and allocation of wealth. Further, even where a patent is valid, a court
might sometimes find it socially desirable to excuse a certain amount of
infringement. The question is whether existing doctrinal tools provide
courts with enough leeway both to account for the PTO's institutional
bias and to balance the interest of the public domain against the exclusive rights of patentees who hold valid patents.
Currently, patentees know that they face three possible outcomes in
any litigation: a holding that the patent is (i) valid and infringed, (ii)
valid but not infringed, or (iii) invalid. The probability of each of these
outcomes influences licensing negotiations. If a court had the option to
add a fourth outcome by holding a patent infringed but the infringement
excused, the patentees' rights would become less certain, potentially
decreasing the cost of the invalid patents issued by the PTO. Courts faced
with the patent presumption of validity may be reluctant to hold patents
invalid in an all-or-nothing decision. A finding that excuses infringement
offers courts another option that would allow them to introduce public
policy concerns into the equation.
Currently, few doctrines in patent law allow a court to excuse
infringement. The experimental use doctrine, patent misuse, and the
reverse doctrine of equivalents are all quite limited. The question is
whether patent law could adopt some cost-effective doctrine that would
allow courts to excuse infringement and thereby help to decrease the cost
of invalid patents.
Clearly, the most cost-effective measure for reducing the cost of invalid patents would be to reform the PTO to more clearly tailor incentives
to encourage the issuance of valid patents. A doctrine that allows a court
to excuse infringement might theoretically decrease the cost of invalid
patents, but that result seems quite speculative. Moreover, such a doctrine may be potentially harmful by decreasing the value of valid patents.
For such a doctrine to make sense, there should be a much firmer basis
on which it may rest.
One place to begin is by analogy to copyright law. For many years,
fair use has helped to police copyright's scope by excusing a certain
amount of infringement when socially beneficial. A similar doctrine in
16 See Merges, supra note 2.
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patent law might prove useful, particularly in dealing with new
technology.
For example, patents on the functional aspects of software may confer a strong competitive advantage on the patentee who owns a patented
interface that becomes a standard. A limited fair use defense that safeguards the original patentee's incentives may give both vertical and horizontal competitors 17 the ability to enter the market, expanding
competition in both research and development and the product market
as well as in the markets for goods compatible with the patented product.
In the biotech area, a limited fair use defense might help to overcome logjams resulting from the splintering of rights. In copyright law,
one of the justifications for fair use is that there are occasions when transaction costs are so high as to prevent socially beneficial licensing from
taking place. To the extent that the same is occurring in biotechnology,
patent law may find it useful to adopt a fair-use-type approach to excuse a
certain amount of socially beneficial infringement.
A full exploration of a patent fair use defense is beyond the scope of
this Essay. 18 The point to keep in mind is that it may be time to reexamine the differing incentive schemes of patent and copyright, particularly for technologies that straddle the borders of the two sets of laws. It
may be useful to adapt existing doctrines in one model to use in the
other if such a change could be institutionally achieved in a cost-effective
manner. Fair use is simply one possible example. However, certainly for
any doctrinal adjustment to be successful, it must be capable of correct
application by the courts.
V.

TRADEMARK LAW

There is little doubt that over time trademark law has moved away
from its traditional role of protecting consumers from confusion and
more toward protecting property rights in the mark itself. Somewhat surprisingly, this change has been driven not so much by new legislation but
by judicial decisions. The question is whether the courts have erred in
applying statutory language expansively, departing from the utilitarian
paradigm, and moving toward one that overprotects trademarks relative
to the social optimum.
Professor Glynn Lunney has thoughtfully chronicled how courts
have departed from congressional intent in granting ever more expansive
17 Horizontal competitors are those in direct competition, such as two PC
operating system providers. Vertical competitors, by contrast, compete in the market
for connecting products. For example, Microsoft's Word for Windows and
WordPerfect for Windows are vertically compatible with the underlying Windows
operating system and compete with each other in the applications software market.
18 For a more complete explanation of the rationale and formulation of a fair

use defense, see Maureen A. O'Rourke, Towards a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law,

100 COLUM. L. REv. (forthcoming 2000).
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trademark protection. 19 As he notes, costs associated with granting property rights in trademarks seem to move the system further from the utilitarian social optimum rather than closer to it. While there are many
conventional examples of this phenomenon, it is also apparent in the
high-tech world of cyberspace.
Courts have stretched the commercial use requirement 2 to hold
cybersquatters liable for either trademark infringement or dilution or
both. While decisions are not uniform, some courts have held that reserving but not using a domain name constitutes a commercial use if the
domain name owner intends to sell it.2 1 Others have held that any use,
however non-commercial in a lay sense, is commercial when conducted
on the Internet. 22 As Professor Mark Lemley notes, cybersquatters may
not be particularly sympathetic defendants, but watering down the commercial use requirement may set a dangerous precedent: "The cybersquatter precedents are already being used by trademark owners to take
domain names away from arguably legitimate users, such as people who
want to register their last names as Internet domains and those who build
a 'gripe site' to complain about a specific product or company."2 3 The
potential also certainly exists for expansive definitions of commercial use
to work mischief in traditional "low-tech" trademark cases.
Congress has passed an amendment to the Lanham Act that directly
addresses cybersquatting, 24 eliminating the need for the courts to contort
conventional requirements to achieve the ostensibly desirable result.
However, this change, in addition to already enacted legislation, demonstrates that Congress has not yet focused on reining in expansive, property-based judicial interpretations of trademark law.
The cybersquatting amendment allows a civil action to be maintained against one who registers a domain name that dilutes a trademark. 25 Other legislation provides that dilution may form the basis for
19Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMoRY LJ. 367, 373-420 (1999).
20 Note that section 32 of the Lanham Act refers to "commercial use" in the
context of infringement (15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1994)), while section 43(c) refers to
"commercial use in commerce" in the context of dilution (Id. § 1125).
21 See, e.g., Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324-26 (9th Cir. 1998);
Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1239 (N.D. Ill. 1996). But see
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 957 (C.D. Cal.
1997) (stating that Network Solutions, the domain name registrar, did not engage in
a use in commerce by issuing domain names for a fee), affd on othergrounds, 194 F.3d
980 (9th Cir. 1999).
2 See, e.g., Jews forJesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 309 (D.NJ. 1998); Planned
Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Bucci, No. 97 Civ. 0629 (KMW), 1997 WL 133313
(S.D.N.Y. March 24, 1997).
23 Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108
YALE L.J. 1687, 1703 (1999) (citations omitted).
24 Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 3000, 113
Stat. 1501, 1537 (1999).
25 Id. § 3002(a).
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opposition to or cancellation of registration. 2 6 While a statutory cause of

action in dilution is available only for "famous" marks, the courts have
been quite willing both to avoid critically analyzing that requirement and
to interpret it to include marks of dubious fame. 27 Further, the conduct

that constitutes "dilution" seems to encompass any conduct that arguably
seems to free-ride in some way on the famous mark owner's goodwill. The
net effect may be that courts, with their expansive definitions of dilution,

will transform the Principal Register into an index only of "famous"
marks.
While copyright helps to demonstrate that flexible doctrines may
help the judiciary correct mistakes of prior decision-makers, and patent
shows that the absence of such doctrines may make error correction less
likely, the moral of the trademark story is that the same types of vague
standards can also introduce errors of their own if misapplied by the
courts. The key in such cases is for Congress to exercise its power to correct errors on the part of the judiciary. Whether Congress has the political will to do so is another matter. The point is that the system is
designed to include checks and balances by assigning different tasks to
decision-makers along the way, circling back to the beginning, and closing the loop of error correction. Yet the intellectual property system is by
no means a closed one. Thus, evaluating its overall performance requires
an assessment of how other sets of laws affect it.
VI.

PLACING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN THE BROADER
LEGAL CONTEXT

Because intellectual property law operates within the wider legal
framework of public and private law, policymakers need not rely solely on
it to implement the social optimum. Rather, to the extent that other bodies of law function to fine-tune the scope of intellectual property rights,
the need for correcting mistakes within the intellectual property system
itself may decline. Two obvious areas of law that affect the actual contours
of intellectual property rights are the public law of antitrust and the private law of contract.
The recent litigation involving Microsoft and Intel raises the issue of
whether antitrust law may somehow limit the terms under which a
monopolist licenses its intellectual property and whether it may, in some
circumstances, have a duty to license. It is black letter law that an intellec28
tual property right does not insulate its owner from antitrust liability.
The common law doctrines of copyright and patent misuse, which are
26 See Trademark Amendments Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-43, 113 Stat. 218.
27 See Lemley, supra note 23, at 1698-99.
28 See, e.g., Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1185

n. 63 (1st Cir. 1994) ("It is in any event well settled that concerted and contractual
behavior that threatens competition is not immune from antitrust inquiry simply
because it involves the exercise of copyright privileges.").
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closely allied to antitrust, have always recognized that the law must be
vigilant in policing the anti-competitive excesses of intellectual property
owners. The more interesting question is whether antitrust functions as
an independent limit on intellectual property law. In the absence of
other anti-competitive conduct, can a monopolist violate the antitrust
laws simply by asserting its intellectual property rights?
Traditionally, the answer has been no, but that may change. For
example, assume that Microsoft has a patent on its Windows application
programming interface. Can that interface become an essential facility to
which Microsoft must grant access despite its intellectual property right to
exclude?
By imposing duties to deal and regulating the terms of those deals,
antitrust law can significantly affect the value of an intellectual property
right, because right owners must consider its limitations in conducting
their business activities. Antitrust can also limit the scope of a right and
could correct some cases in which the intellectual property system has
erred by granting rights that are too broad.
The question is whether this is an appropriate role for antitrust law.
It is likely to be less sensitive to the balance that intellectual property has
struck, and its remedies can be quite severe, extending all the way to
structural relief. The real warning for intellectual property law may be
that unless it can police its own house, antitrust will step in and perform
that function, potentially introducing unanticipated incentive effects.
While antitrust law may limit the exercise of intellectual property
rights, contract law may do the opposite. In two-party agreements, the
licensor and licensee may agree to terms that are more or less restrictive
or co-extensive with the rights intellectual property would accord the particular information. Contracts that provide the licensee with the same or
broader rights than it would have under intellectual property law seem
rather innocuous (although possibly indicative of overprotection), but
those that place restrictions on information that the public law would not
raise the issue of federal preemption.
The fact that the intellectual property system does not routinely
grant the socially optimal level of protection can help to inform the preemption decision. For example, if the intellectual property statutes
underprotect particular types of information, contracts that are more
restrictive than the public law may function to correct its errors. On the
other hand, if the particular information is likely to be overprotected,
additional contractual restrictions may, in some circumstances, be socially
costly and better candidates for preemption. The point is that the preemption inquiry needs to be sensitive to the fact that contract law can
perform a useful function by allowing parties to correct the mistakes of
intellectual property law.
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CONCLUSION

It is not surprising that all decision-makers in the intellectual property system have, at one time or another, deviated from the utilitarian
paradigm. The manner in which these deviations occur may color one's
perceptions regarding what corrective measures should be taken, if any.
Certainly one task for policymakers at the turn of the century is to assess
whether institutional changes are desirable.
Yet this may obscure an even deeper question. This Essay has argued
that institutions have departed from the utilitarian paradigm underlying
the grant of intellectual property rights. But what of other models? For
example, on the Internet, it may be that the utilitarian paradigm should
apply to commercial information, the self-actualization theory to personal
web sites and the social planning theory to information related to political debates. Will the same rules work in each of these "zones"?
At the end of the twentieth century, then, the task at hand is
thoughtfully to re-examine policy, particularly in light of technology that
threatens to render legal solutions obsolete. No one theoretical paradigm
adequately captures all of the policy interests that intellectual property
law serves. The most challenging task is to develop an integrated vision
for the "information age" that reflects real societal choices. In turn, these
choices may translate into a coherent intellectual property system. At the
end of the day, it may be the case that of the many reasons for institutional failure, the most serious is our own inability adequately to articulate and agree on a theoretical paradigm that could guide institutions in
their decisionmaking.

